Frege, Relativism and Faultless Disagreement

This post is re-presents an article of the same name by Sven Rosenkranz, found in the volume Relative Truth1.

Intro

Truth Relativism2 can be an attractive prospect. In aesthetics, in ethics, and elsewhere, there are insoluble disputes, where not only does neither side appear to have epistemic advantage over the other, but it seems quite natural to say that both sides are entitled to their opinions. That is, there seem to be faultless disagreements, where the assertions of each disputant are in contradiction, and yet where each side is correct to assert as they do. Supposing that this is an accurate read of the situation, how are we to make sense of it? Enter Relativism: the simultaneous correctness of both claims is to be explained by the fact that each claim is true relative to the claimant’s perspective. Unfortunately, the hope that Relativism can support the notion of faultless disagreement appears to be forlorn.
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