What follows is a reworking of my previous posts on evil, which I wanted to combine into one document. Much of the material is the same, though I’ve clarified it some, and added another objection. Since I seem to have gone about as far as I can for the moment, it’s posted.
EDIT: Best version and last version here.
Groundwork for the Argument
I begin by picking up a thread of inquiry which Alvin Plantinga follows in God, Freedom, and Evil1. There we find Plantinga examining the logical problem of evil, as given by J.L. Mackie in his 1955 paper, Evil and Omnipotence. According to Plantinga, Mackie takes the following propositions to form an inconsistent set..
(1) God is omnipotent
(2) God is wholly good
(3) Evil exists.
(19) A good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can
(20) There are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do.
.. all of which seem plausible on theism. Yet if the set is inconsistent at least one proposition must be rejected on pain of contradiction. Since (3) is obvious, while (19) and (20) appear to be sound definitions, it appears that either (1) or (2) must go, or both, if the presupposition of God’s existence is false. But Plantinga contests (19) on several grounds, guiding a cascade of revisions, the most important amongst these being that if some evils are logically required for the existence of a greater good, then we would expect that a good being would not eliminate the evil, as this would also eliminate the good. Eventually, he settles on an inconsistent set of propositions from which a valid argument from evil may be constructed:
(1) God is omnipotent.
(2) God is wholly good.
(2′) God is omniscient.
(3) Evil exists.
(19c) An omnipotent and omniscient good being eliminates every evil that it can properly eliminate.
(20) There are no nonlogical limits to what an omnipotent being can do.
(21) If God is omniscient and omnipotent, then he can properly eliminate every evil state of affairs.
So, having constructed this set, why does Plantinga doubt that a logical argument succeeds? Because, he tells us, (21) is possibly false, whereas it needs to be a necessary truth in order to ensure that the existence of God and the existence of evil are incompatible. I aim to show that, pace Plantinga, something like (21) is necessarily true, though I shall first reformulate Plantinga’s set into an argument, making two improvements along the way.
The first change I make to the set above is to replace talk of ‘proper elimination’ with that of ‘denial of existence’. According to Plantinga, “a being properly eliminates an evil state of affairs if it eliminates that evil without either eliminating an outweighing good or bringing about a greater evil”2. But this notion appears to be inadequate, for it seems to be consistent with unjustifiable evil existing in the world, so long as God eventually gets around to dispensing with it. A fortiori, Plantinga’s formulation places no restriction on what God creates, good or evil. By contrast, the requirement that God should deny existence to every evil does restrict the scope of what God would create and allow3.
One further adjustment is needed. Plantinga indicates that a premise like (21) can easily be falsified, since there might be some state of affairs S, such that S is good overall, but where a constituent of S is an arbitrary evil – for example, S might represent the conjunction of “Alvin is deliriously happy” with “Paul has a minor abrasion”. A conjunction entails its conjuncts, and so (21) is false if any good outweighs some evil, and if these are compossible. The obvious way in which (21) goes wrong (or in which it is ambiguous) is that the “goods” and “evils” cover complex states of affairs, whereas it is not specifically these that we think of as goods and evils in the context of the argument from evil. What usually comes to mind are goods or evils conceived as basic, the kind of goods and evils which are at once atomistic and general. Being atomistic, they do not divide into conjuncts responsible for their value as a whole; being general, they describe types of good or evil which have particular tokens. In short, I think we require good-making and evil-making properties, which I define thus:
Good-making Property: A property which (i) is objectively good, and (ii) cannot be decomposed into constituent properties in virtue of which it is good.
Evil-making Property: A property which (i) is objectively evil, and (ii) cannot be decomposed into constituent properties in virtue of which it is evil.
For brevity’s sake, I’ll call these GMPs and EMPs in what follows, and ‘properties’ will refer to these kinds of properties. With these adjustments, and some minor tweaks to presentation, I can now advance this essay’s main argument.
The Argument from Evil
(1) If God exists, then God is an omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good being.
(2) An omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good being denies existence to every evil-making property whose existence is not entailed by some greater good-making property.
(3) Every evil-making property is such that its existence is not entailed by some greater good-making property.
(4) Therefore, if God exists, every evil-making property is such that God denies it existence.
(5) Evil-making properties exist (since evil exists).
(6) If God exists, then some evil-making property exists and it is the case that God denies it existence (which would be contradictory).
(7) Therefore, God does not exist.
(NB: References to numbered premises will henceforth be to this argument). The argument is valid. But is it sound? Well, (1) is a uncontroversial statement of traditional theism, and (2) seems unobjectionable as well. (5) has as good a claim to truth as any other moral assertion. (4), (6) and (7) are logical consequences. That leaves (3), which makes an obviously outrageous claim. And yet I think standard philosophical theism is committed to this claim:
A Sub-Argument for (3)
(A) God exists. (Assumption)
(B) If God exists, it is possible that he should exist, without any other thing existing.
(C) If God exists, then he instantiates all good-making properties, and no evil-making properties.
(D) Thus, it is possible that God alone should exist, instantiating all good-making properties and no evil-making properties.
(E) Then, there is no good-making property whose instantiation entails instantiation of an evil-making property.
(F) Therefore, every evil-making property is such that its existence is not entailed by some good-making property.
(3) Every evil-making property is such that its existence is not entailed by some greater good-making property.
Let’s run through the premises. (A) assumes God’s existence, which every theist must do also. (B) asserts the ontological independence of God, which various notions of God support. For example, the notion of God as ‘the ground of all being’ stipulates the being of God as prior to, and supportive of, the existence of anything else: this is God’s sovereignty and aseity. The conception of God as a necessary being, particularly as used in the Cosmological Argument, is taken to imply his ontological independence. And lastly, it would seem that ontological independence is a perfection, which a perfect-being such as God would exemplify4. Less abstractly, imagine the state of affairs prior to God’s creation ex nihilo: supposedly God alone exists, and afterward performs the acte gratuit of creating the universe. If actual, this scenario is certainly possible, and so (B) would be true.
(C) explicates a plausible interpretation of God’s being wholly good: of any GMPs that he has them, and of any EMPs that he lacks them5. The strongest way in which this premise may be justified is if one takes God to be goodness itself, so that ‘God’ and ‘good’ are interdefinable. Since goodness itself cannot be evil, God would have no EMPs, and since goodness itself cannot fail to include some GMP (else that property would not be good), neither would God lack any GMPs. A supporter of this view is William Lane Craig, here responding to the Euthyphro dilemma:
“God’s character is definitive of moral goodness; it serves as the paradigm of moral goodness. Thus, the morally good/bad is determined by reference to God’s nature; the morally right/wrong is determined by reference to his will… If the non-theist should demand, “Why pick God’s nature as definitive of the Good?” the answer is that God, by definition, is the greatest conceivable being, and a being which is the paradigm of goodness is greater than one which merely exemplifies goodness.”6
Notice that Craig appeals to perfect-being theology as a reason to identify God with the good, an orthodoxy with distinguished luminaries (Anselm, Aquinas, Leibniz.. many more7). But even leaving aside this argument, (C) is compelling: we understand God as being without flaw (hence without EMPs), and as being good in every way that something can be good. Of course, this does not mean that each of God’s properties are good, for some may be neither good-making nor evil-making, but value-neutral.
(D) gathers (A), (B) and (C) together. (E) draws the consequence of (D). To see this, suppose the contrary, that some GMP does entail an EMP: then, if the GMP exists, so must the evil-making one. But (D) states that this is not so, that every GMP can exist (as God) in the absence of every EMP. So if (E) is false, then (D) is false, thus (D) entails (E). Similarly, (F) is a deductive consequence of (E). Suppose the contrary, that there is some evil-making property whose existence is entailed by a GMP. Then there would be a GMP which entailed it, whereas (E) states that no GMPs entail EMPs. If (F) is false, (E) is false, so (E) entails (F). (3) is a special case of (F) – if every EMP is not entailed by a GMP, then a fortiori, they are not entailed by greater GMPs. So there we have it, support for (3). And with it, I believe, a successful argument from evil.
(I) I disagree with (C): God does not instantiate every good-making property, but on the contrary, only most good-making properties – those which are compossible.
Reply: No argument from evil covers every conception of God, and this argument is unexceptional in that regard8. Nevertheless, I believe the arguments here cover standard philosophical theism, which endorses the thesis that God is a perfect-being. This is because God’s perfection seems to entail the having of every GMP:
(I) God is a perfect-being.
(II) A perfect-being instantiates every perfection.
(III) A perfection is an optimal fulfillment of some evaluative dimension.
(IV) So, God optimally fulfills every evaluative dimension.
(V) To instantiate a good-making property is to optimally fulfill an evaluative dimension – namely, the binary dimension which concerns the having or not of the good-making property.
(VI) So, God instantiates every good-making property.
(I) expresses perfect-being theology. (II) is a definitional expansion of (I) – a Cartesian claim which, so far as I’m aware, is accepted by all perfect-being theologians, this being the premise which allows them to infer that God has any individual perfection (e.g. necessary existence, omniscience, perfect goodness)9. (III) expresses perfection. (V) includes its explanation – whatever else a GMP is, it is evaluative, and being evaluative, it implies some dimension (scale) on which it is evaluative – at least the GMP/~GMP dimension. (IV) and (VI) are logical consequences, the latter confirming the suspect fragment of (C). The second conjunct in (C), that God instantiates no evil-making property is, I presume, uncontroversial. I therefore take it that perfect-being theology is committed to (C).
(II) Theodicy/Defense X solves the logical problem of evil. Since your argument does not deal with theodicy/defense X, you have not made your case.
Reply: Supposing the Argument and the Sub-Argument are sound, I have indeed made my case. For a sound deductive argument necessitates its conclusion, and so, whatever else there may be to say about why a given theodicy fails, the arguments here make it given that it does so. But since I realize that many readers will want more of an explanation before they feel convinced, I will offer some general remarks.
The conspicuous premise of the Argument is (3), and it is conspicuous precisely because it is designed to cover all theodicies: every viable theodicy purports to cite a greater good for whose sake evil may be justified. So my general reply to those who wonder why their pet theodicy fails is given in the support for (3), the Sub-Argument. That argument works by exploiting a double standard inherent in theodicies: on the one hand, theists claim the existence of a perfect-being, who has every perfection and is without flaw; on the other hand, a theodicy claims the regrettable but necessary imperfectibility of the created world. But whatever is actual is possible, therefore, if perfection is actual in the form of God, perfection is possible. Since an omnipotent God can bring about any states of affairs which are logically possible, God can bring about a perfect creation. And so theodicies are destined to fail.
The free-will defense perhaps deserves special mention here. It might be thought that, contrary to the usual form of a theodicy, where the greater GMP straightforwardly entails an EMP, free-will merely makes evil possible – a denial of (2) rather than (3). However, if possibility is all that follows from the good of free-will, then the connection between the GMP of free-will and any EMP is not necessary, and so it seems open to an omnipotent being to bring about free-will without allowing evil. Hence, contemporary apologists attempt to show that (for all we know) free-will does entail evil via certain ‘counterfactuals of freedom’ – conditionals which state what free persons would do if placed in particular circumstances – and in doing so dispute (3). Therefore our treatment will be the same as other theodicies: find and exploit the double standard at the heart of the theodicy. On the one hand, the theist wants to say that human free-will opens up the possibility of evil; but on the other hand, the theist wishes to maintain that this possibility is not open to God, at least not in a way that he would avail himself of it. But if God does not have free-will, then free-will can’t be a GMP, else God would have it. Alternatively, if God has free-will, but of a different sort to our own, then God’s free-will is a GMP, and human free-will is only good insofar as it approximates God’s sort of free-will. Either way, the free-will defense fails because of its differential treatment of God and man. However…
(III) Your argument assumes that creation could be God-like, in that God could avoid creating anything which, in departure from his own nature, would introduce evil into the world. But you have overlooked the one property which God does not instantiate, but which must be instantiated by his creation: that of being created by God. This property, perhaps together with other good-making properties, does entail evil.
Reply: Quentin Smith offers an argument temperamentally similar to my own, in A Sound Logical Argument from Evil. He begins by distinguishing three different varieties of freedom..
A person is externally free with respect to an action A if and only if nothing other than (external to) herself determines either that she perform A or refrain from performing A.
A person is internally free with respect to an action A if and only if it is false that his past physical and psychological states, in conjunction with causal laws, determine either that he perform A or refrain from performing A.
A person is logically free with respect to an action A if and only if there is some possible world in which he performs A and there is another possible world in which he does not perform A. A person is logically free with respect to a wholly good life (a life in which every morally relevant action performed by the person is a good action) if and only if there is some possible world in which he lives this life and another possible world in which he does not.10
.. and notes that, whilst God has internal and external freedom, his omnibenevolence precludes logical freedom. From this infers he that logical freedom is not metaphysically valuable (else God would have it), though internal and external freedom may be. He then constructs an argument from evil asserting that God could’ve created necessarily good (thus logically unfree) but internally and externally free beings, like himself, and therefore need not and would not have created a world in which moral evil exists11. Alexander Pruss, in The Essential Divine-Perfection Objection to the Free-Will Defence, takes up our objection and extends it:
The initial form of my argument is very simple. If Patricia is a creature who lacks logical freedom with respect to a wholly good life, then by Smith’s definition either it is a necessary truth that if Patricia exists, Patricia leads a wholly good life, or it is a necessary truth that if Patricia exists, Patricia does not lead a wholly good life. For concreteness, take the first case: that Patricia exists entails that Patricia leads a wholly good life […] Then, that God creates Patricia entails that Patricia exists. Therefore, that God creates Patricia entails that Patricia leads a wholly good life. But surely that means that Patricia is determined to lead a wholly good life by something external to her, namely by God’s creating her. Hence, she is not externally free with respect to leading a wholly good life.12
At first pass this response looks decisive. It is undeniable that God has the property of being uncreated, whereas any of his creations must have the property of being created. It is undeniable that, as God is part of a causal chain leading to any particular of Patricia’s actions, God qualifies as a cause of them. And it further appears that some notion of libertarian free-will will support the idea that causal origination in God would be freedom-canceling. However, Pruss’s argument fails because it applies indiscriminately to all creatures, whether logically free or not.
To begin with, notice that God’s entailment of Patricia’s virtuous behavior proceeds by way of her counterfactuals of freedom. Pruss tells us that Patricia’s existence entails her leading a wholly good life, and this is only true if Patricia’s existence entails those counterfactuals that ensure every morally relevant action she performs is good. So we can gloss Pruss’s argument in a way which makes this salient: God creates Patricia in circumstances C, she has certain counterfactuals of freedom specifying a good action A in C, and so God determines her doing of A in C. But since the same is true of every action Patricia performs, and since every action Patricia performs is good, it is (surely!) the case that God determines that she lead a wholly good life. Hence, she is not externally free with respect to leading a wholly good life.
Yet if this is how the entailment is derived, then it is not just necessarily good creatures who are determined by God, but creatures of every stripe. For consider Manuel, a person-essence whose counterfactuals of freedom support a mixture of right and wrong actions. That God creates Manuel in circumstances C, having counterfactuals of freedom specifying his doing A in C, means that God determines his doing of A in C. The same is true of every action Manuel performs. To complete the symmetry, we can let ‘M-life’ denote the kind of life that Manuel would live in C given his counterfactuals of freedom – then, that God creates Manuel in C (surely!) determines that he lead an M-life. Hence, Manuel is not externally free with respect to leading an M-life. Thus, Pruss’s counter to Smith would seem to lay waste to the external freedom of God’s creation generally.
It isn’t difficult to see where your typical free-will defender will think this goes awry. The free-will defense typically distinguishes between strong and weak actualization, where to strongly actualize a state of affairs is to be the cause of that state, and to weakly actualize a state of affairs is to strongly actualize (cause) a subset of some state of affairs containing free beings, who complete that state with their free acts. The point of such a distinction, as I understand it, is to allow us to separate the issue of entailment (which weak actualization implies) from that of causation and hence responsibility (which strong actualization implies). But if the distinction is to do its job it must be the case that, though God’s bringing about C would counterfactually entail some person-essence’s action A, this entailment is not sufficient for God himself to cause and therefore be responsible for A. Plausibly this is so: despite entailment, we think that God only controls an initial segment of the causal chain specified in C, and that consequently he does not determine the outcome of the process in the relevant sense – his creatures do. But then, by creating necessarily good beings, God need not control all parts of the causal chain either – he can leave the counterfactuals of freedom to be determined by his necessarily good beings† 13.
So it would seem that creaturehood cannot be used to support the free-will defense after all – it either cancels external freedom for all creatures, or mistakenly overlooks the distinction between strong and weak actualization. But could another defense be mounted on the basis of it? I have no argument that it cannot. All I can say here is that the free-will defense appears to be the only apologetic which might put the difference to use. This being so, I take my argument for the non-existence of God to be complete.
I began this essay by looking at Alvin Plantinga’s God, Freedom, and Evil, wherein we find the general form of a successful argument from evil. I made two adjustments to this form: first, by eschewing talk of ‘proper elimination’ in favor of ‘denial of existence’ talk; and second, by bringing in the notions of good-making and evil-making properties. With these changes, I proposed a valid argument from evil. I then noted that, as the other premises were unobjectionable, the weight of the argument fell on premise (3), the proposition that “Every evil-making property is such that its existence is not entailed by some greater good-making property“. I offered a sub-argument for this premise, using the notion of God’s ontological independence (i.e. that “it is possible that [God] should exist, without any other thing existing.”) and his perfection (i.e. that God “instantiates all good-making properties, and no evil-making properties”) to show that, if theism is true, then (3) is also true. But if (3) is true, of course, then the argument from evil proposed succeeds – so theism, if true, is false, therefore it is false.
Finally, I considered three objections. The first of these objected to the premise stating God would instantiate every good-making property, and no evil-making property. I conceded to this objection the point that my argument would not disprove every conception of God, but bolstered my argument that it would apply to God conceived as a perfect-being, and thereby to the God of orthodox philosophical theism. I then considered the objection that my argument ignores the various attempts to reconcile evil and the existence of God, making it inadequate. My reply here was to give a general answer, grounded in the sub-argument, such that by its lights any theodicy would have to be guilty of a double-standard. Lastly, I considered an exception to the argument, in the form of a property which all God’s creation must have, but which God himself would not have – that of being created by God. Because God does not have this property, we cannot use the sub-argument to show that it does not entail evil, nor that its combination with other good-making properties would not entail evil. In this vein I consider the response of Pruss to Smith’s logical argument from evil, and assess Pruss’s counter as failing to support the free-will defense. Given the failure of these objections, and being unaware of any others, I conclude that the theist must accept the soundness of the Argument From Evil. Thus, standard philosophical theism is untenable.
1 Plantinga, p. 12-29.
2 Plantinga, p. 20.
3 Another reason is that Plantinga’s formulation leads one to think that the problem of evil is a problem of God’s non-intervention, given that the world is the way it is and contains evil. But the problem of evil is much broader than that of non-intervention in a ready-made world: it is a problem of the world’s having evil in the first place.
4 There’s an objection from Platonism I ignore here: that abstract objects exist necessarily, and so God could not exist alone. The objection is easily enough handled, for I need only modify (B) so that God is ontologically independent of concreta, and add as a premise: “Only concrete objects can instantiate EMPs”. This adjustment aside, there might be good reason to take abstract objects as part of God, which would support (B).
5 This may not be obvious if one is thinking of moral goodness alone. However, it is said that God’s goodness does not merely consist in how he acts, but in what he is: goodness has a metaphysical sense. “God is said to be good in a wider or narrower sense; wider, when this indicates the fullness and completeness of his being, his self-sufficiency and freedom from want or deficiency of any kind. In this sense of “ perfect goodness ” it has the same reference as “ perfect being, ”though a different sense. Divine perfection provides the conceptual link between being and goodness in God’ s case; God alone is, and can be, good. In the narrower sense God’ s goodness is an aspect of his moral character, and he communicates this goodness to his creatures in acts of creation and redemption.” (Paul Helm, ‘Goodness‘, in The Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Religion, p. 263).
6 Craig, p. 182.
7 Anselm: “Now, one thing is necessary, viz., that one necessary Being in which there is every good – or better, who is every good, one good, complete good, and the only good” (Proslogion, Ch. 23). Aquinas: “All the perfections of all things are in God” (1964, pt. I, q. 4, art. 2). Leibniz: “41. Whence it follows that God is absolutely perfect; for perfection is nothing but amount of positive reality, in the strict sense, leaving out of account the limits or bounds in things which are limited. And where there are no bounds, that is to say in God, perfection is absolutely infinite. (Theod. 22, Pref. [E. 469 a; G. vi. 27].)”.
8 As Jordan Howard-Sobel tells us, “The logical problem of evil is a problem for perfect-being theologies only” (p. 479).
9 More support: “According to traditional Western theism, God is the greatest being possible in virtue of possessing a complete set of great-making qualities or perfections”. Hoffman & Rosenkranz, p.15.
10 Smith, “A Sound Logical Argument from Evil” in Ethical and Religious Thought in Analytic Philosophy of Language (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 149. (Emphasis added).
11 On Smith’s view, such necessarily good beings are not humans who have been restricted to the good, nor are they humans whose counterfactuals of freedom just happen to ensure their perfect goodness in the actual world. Instead, they are to be understood as a class of beings over and above humans, internally-externally free but logically determined, but who might qualify as ‘human’ in a loose sense as being similarly rational persons. Though Smith doesn’t say so directly, his reference to a class of necessarily good beings suggests that their goodness is essential to them, as it is to God. Pruss (see below) does not always observe this difference between humans and these ‘humans’ in arguing for his position, crucial though it is: “[Patricia] has a certain nature, and God has created Patricia as having that nature. But surely then God has determined her to act rightly.” (Pruss, p. 441, emphasis mine).
12 Pruss, p. 435-6.
13 Pruss further argues that creaturehood and a lack of logical freedom entails a lack of internal freedom, chiefly on the grounds that logical determination would have to be grounded in internal dispositional states. I do not treat this here because (i) Pruss does not show that internal freedom can be had in the absence of logical determination, which would be necessary to justify God’s creating logically free beings as securing the supposed greater good of internal freedom, and (ii) Pruss needs to show that his arguments against internal freedom in logically determined creatures do not also apply to God, but does not do much more than gesture towards a Thomistic metaphysics.
† Spelt out: Let “P c Q & Q c R” symbolize “P causes Q, and Q causes R”. Then, that God causes Patricia, who in turn causes action R fits this form. Pruss derives from God’s causing Patricia, and Patricia’s causing R, that therefore God causes R, i.e. from “P c Q & Q c R” that “Q c R”, which is perfectly valid – causation is transitive, and so the predecessor in a causal chain will always be a (not necessarily the) cause of a later event in the chain. However, this is not the causation required for cancelling freedom. What is needed instead is that God causes Patricia to cause action R, for him to cause her counterfactual of freedom. So, what Pruss really needs to deduce from “P c Q & Q c R” is “P c (Q c R)”. But this derivation is fallacious. For example, though true that “smoking causes cancer, and cancer causes death”, it is not true that smoking causes the causal relation between cancer and death itself, for the causal relation between cancer and death obtains regardless of whether there is anybody who smokes. Likewise, it does not follow from God’s causing Patricia, and Patricia’s causing action R, that God causes Patricia to cause that action.
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Anselm, Proslogion, with the Replies of Gaunilo and Anselm. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2001.
Helm, P., ‘Goodness’, in The Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2010). pp. 263-269.
Hoffman, J., and Rosenkrantz. G.S.. The Divine Attributes (Exploring the Philosophy of Religion). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002.
Craig, W.L., Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics. Leicester, England: Crossway Books, 2008.
Leibniz, G.W., The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings. New York City: Cornell University Library, 2009.
Mackie, J.L., “Evil and Omnipotence”, Mind 64 (1955); reprinted in Louis P. Pojman (ed), Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, 3rd edition (Wadsworth, 1998), pp. 186–193.
Plantinga, A.: God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974).
Pruss, A., “The Essential Divine-Perfection Objection to the Free-Will Defence”, Religious Studies 44, (Cambridge University Press, 2008). pp. 433–444.
Smith, Q., “A Sound Logical Argument from Evil” in Ethical and Religious Thought in Analytic Philosophy of Language (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1997).
Sobel, J.H., Logic and Theism: Arguments For and Against Beliefs in God. 1 ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).